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Owens: Jury Instructions: How to Abolish the Mann Charge

CASE COMMENTS
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: HOW TO ABOLISH THE MANN CHARGE*
United States v. Chiantese,560 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1977)
2
Appellants, owners of a valet parking service, were convicted' of extortion
and interference with interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 23
and 1951. 4 Appellants contended on appeal 5 that the trial court had erred6 in
instructing the jury on proof of intent, alleging that the objectionable instruction, known as the Mann7 charge, shifted the burden of proof from the prosecu-

*EDITOR'S NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the Winter 1978 quarter.
1. Appellants were convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida at Ft. Lauderdale by Judge Norman C. Roettger, Jr. John Joseph Cerrella
and Thomas Joseph Chiantese were sentenced to prison terms of 16 years and 13 years, respectively. United States v. Chiantese, 546 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1977).
2. Chiantese and Cerella had several meetings with Mark Parnass, owner of a competing
valet parking service. According to Parnass' testimony, these meetings culminated in an
ultimatum that Parness give a third of his business to Chiantese and Cerrella or discontinue
his parking operation. Id. at 136.
3. 18 U.S.C. §2 (1970): "(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal. (b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."
4. 18 U.S.C. §1951 (1970): "(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion
or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or
psoperty in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
5. United States v. Chiantese, 546 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1977).
6. A second error was also urged by appellants. This error, which was not considered in
the en banc opinion and is not a subject of this Comment, concerned the conduct of several
jurors seen "talking and nodding together" during the questioning of a government witness
by Cerrella's attorney. Id. at 136.
7. The charge was first brought to the attention of the Fifth Circuit and held to constitute plain error in Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
986 (1964).
The instruction given in Mann stated: "It is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily
intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted.
So unless the contrary appears from the evidence, the jury may draw the inference that the
accused intended all the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and possessing
like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from any act knowingly done or
knowingly omitted by the accused." Id. at 407. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
This instruction first appeased in Form 39, Proof of Intent, in Mathes, Some Suggested
Forms for Use in Criminal Cases, 20 F.R.D. 231, 264-65 (1957). It continued to appear in subsequent versions and gradually underwent revision. The current version reads: "Intent
ordinarily may not be proved directly, because there is no way of fathoming or scrutinizing
the operations of the human mind. But you may infer the defendant's intent from the surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statement made and done or omitted by the
defendant, and all other facts and circumstances in evidence which indicate his state of mind.
You may consider it reasonable to draw the inference and find that a person intends the
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tion to the defendant. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting as a three
judge panel, reversed the district court decision, stating that the only way to
end the use of the Mann charge was to reverse the conviction in the case at
bar.8 Upon rehearing, the court en banc vacated the original decision in part 9
and HELD,o (1) no district court within the Fifth Circuit should include in
its charge an instruction on proof of intent containing language which could
reasonably be interpreted as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant; (2)
such error will not be cured by other parts of the instructions properly defining
the burden of proof; but (3)the giving of a charge in violation of these directions will not automatically produce reversible error.11
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.1 2 Pursuant to this requirement, the prosecution always bears the burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 13 Therefore, if a jury charge includes wording that may be interpreted by the jury as shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant to produce evidence supporting his innocence, due
process rights may be threatened and an error of constitutional dimensions may
result."4
natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. As I have
said, it is entirely up to you to decide what facts to find from the evidence." 1 E. DEvrrT &
C. BI ACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §14.13 (3d ed. 1977).
8. United States v. Chiantese, 546 F.2d 135, 137 (5th Cir. 1977). The court reasoned:
"Thus we have preached, and we assumed that the district courts have read our earlier
opinions, but as with the boy who yelled wolf too often, our warnings have gone unheeded .... After all of this preaching and admonitions we conclude that this case should
be the vehicle to bury the condemned, prejudicial charge once and for all. And the way to
do it is to reverse the case without adding to the confusion, or worse, an invitation to trial
judges to flirt with its use in the hope that we will find some extenuation in the use accompanied by some high sounding, but unheeded, pontificial platitudes that surely never again
will it be employed. Until Mann is buried by the Court en banc it is very much alive. It is
not-the word is not-to be used, and no one, prosecutor or judge can hope to be
resuscitated." Id.
9. The case was remanded to the three judge panel. United States v. Chiantese, 460 F.2d
1244 (5th Cir. 1977).
10. This holding was given prospective application only by the court's final directive. Id.
at 1256.
11. Id. at 1244.
12.

U.S. CoNsrT. amend. V.

13. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (due process clause required that
the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion or sudden
provocation when the defense was properly presented in a homicide case); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process clause required that the prosecution prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged). See generally Holland
& Chamberlin, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 7 VAL.
U.L. REv. 147 (1973); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L. J. 1299 (1977); Note, Criminal Law-Presumptions: Abrogating
the Use of Presumptive Language in Jury Instructions on Specific Intent, 12 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 301 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Law-Presumptions]; Comment, Criminal
Statutory Presumptions and the Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof: Is Due Process Overdue?, 19 ST.Louis U.L.J. 223 (1974).
14. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See also Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463 (1943) in which the Court ruled that the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
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Historically, shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution in a criminal
matter has not always been held to constitute error. In Agnew v. United
States,15 an 1896 Supreme Court decision, the jury was instructed that intent
could be presumed from the doing of the wrongful act and that the burden of
rebutting the presumption then fell upon the defendant. 16 The Court acknowledged that in a criminal proceeding the burden of establishing guilt rests upon
the prosecution.' 7 The majority noted, however, that once a prima facie case
has been established, conviction follows unless that case is rebutted, and thus
the accused must necessarily produce rebuttal evidence.18 Accordingly, the
Court approved the charge when considered as a whole, accepting it as a correct interpretation of the law. 19
Since the Agnew decision, however, the courts have not generally interpreted the law as allowing such a shift of the burden of proof.' 0 For example,
in Morissette v. United States,21 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for
the taking of government property, holding that presumptive intent has no
amendments limit the power of Congress or of a state legislature to create a statutory presumption making proof of one fact or a group of facts evidence of the existence of another
fact upon which guilt is predicated. See generally Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme
Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate
Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269 (1977); Fuller & Urich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality
of Statutory Presumptions that Lessen the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV.
420, 427 (1971); Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REV. 775 (1975); Note, Tot v.
United States: Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1324
(1943); Criminal Law-Presumptions,supra note 13, at 304-05.
15. 165 U.S. 36 (1896). But see Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664, 681-82 (1896) ("The
burden of proving ... the defendant's guilt as charged rests upon the government, and this
burden does not shift from it.").
16. The jury was charged: "The intent may be presumed from the doing of the wrongful or fraudulent or illegal act, and in this case, if you find that the defendant [did a certain
act], from such finding of fact you must necessarily infer that the intent with which he did
that act was to injure or defraud the bank; but this inference or presumption is not necessarily conclusive. There may be other evidence which may satisfy the jury that there was no
such intent, but such an inference or presumption throws the burden of proof upon the
defendant; and the evidence upon him in rebuttal to do away with that presumption of
guilty intent must be sufficiently strong to satisfy you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there
was no such guilty intent in such transaction." 165 U.S. at 49.
17. Id. at 49-50. See also Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 496, 487-88 (1895) (discussing
the presumption of sanity and burden of proof).
18. 165 U.S. at 50. The Court continued that the question of particular intent was
rightly treated as a question for the jury and that, although the instruction stating that the
evidence necessary to overcome the presumption must be strong enough to satisfy the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt was open to objection for want of accuracy, it could not have
tended to prejudice the defendant when the charge was considered as a whole. Id. See also
Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964) (discussed in note 36 infra).
19. 165 U.S. at 50.
20. The Fifth Circuit has questioned whether the Court would approve the Agnew charge
today. See United States v. Wilkinson, 460 F.2d 725, 730 n.3 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Brown,
The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Law Presumptions, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 141, 157
(1966); Holland & Chamberlin, supra note 13; Note, Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 21
LoY. L. REv. 377 (1975).
21. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 6
CASE COMMENTS

1978]

place in situations where intent is an ingredient of the crime. 22 The majority
considered the effects of both a conclusive presumption, 2 which would effectively eliminate the element of intent altogether, and a permissive presumption, 24 which the Court perceived as precluding the jury from reaching its own
decision.2' The majority concluded that either of these interpretations would
conflict with the basic overriding presumption of innocence. 26 Following the
Morissette decision, the Fifth Circuit confronted the same issue in several appeals involving similar burden-shifting charges. 27 Reversing a tax evasion conviction in Berkovitz v. United States,28 the court made a distinction between
telling jurors that they could consider facts as tending to establish guilt and
telling them that they could presume inculpatory intent therefrom, concluding
that the latter necessarily shifted the burden to the accused to establish his innocence.

29

Against this background, the Fifth Circuit confronted the problematic instruction given in Mann v. United States.s0 Although the Mann charge author22. Id. at 275. In Morissette, the defendant admitted taking government casings but
claimed that he thought they were abandoned property. The trial court ruled that intent was
presumed from the defendant's action in taking the casings without permission from government property. Because the defendant openly admitted that he intended to take the casings,
the trial court refused to allow as a defense his belief that the casings were abandoned. Id. at
249.
23. The Court defined a conclusive presumption as one that could not be overthrown by
testimony. Id. at 275.
24. A permissive presumption was defined as one that would permit but not require the
jury to assume intent from an isolated fact. Id.
25. Id. See Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1964) (comparing inference, conclusive presumption, and rebuttable presumption). See generally Laughlin, In
Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions,52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 196-207 (1953); Morgan,
FurtherObservations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. Rav. 245 (1943); Morgan, Instructing the
Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REv. 59 (1933); Criminal LawPresumptions,supra note 13, at 301 n.2.

26. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. at 275. The Court noted that the judiciary should
not improvise incriminating presumption, and that even congressional power to substitute
presumptions for proof is limited (citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943)). See note
14 supra.

27. See, e.g., Windisch v. United States, 295 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1961) (affirming tax
evasion conviction; erroneous presumption charge was cured by the trial court judge's correct specific intent instructions); Berkovitz v. United States, 213 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1954) (see
text accompanying notes 28-29 infra); Wardlaw v. United States, 203 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953)
(reversing tax evasion conviction due to the use of a presumptive intent instruction where
specific intent was required).
28. 213 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1954).
29. Id. at 476. In Berkovitz, the defense to the tax evasion charge was good faith and the
absence of intent to defeat the tax. The jury charge stated: "The presumption is that a
person intends the natural consequences of his acts, and the natural presumption would be
if a person consciously, knowingly, or intentionally did not set up his income and thereby the
government was cheated or defrauded of taxes, that he intended to defeat the tax." Id. at
468-69. The court reasoned that these instructions, in effect, informed the jury that such proof
was sufficient without more evidence of criminal intent. Id. at 476. The exact charge given in
Berkovitz was also held to be erroneous in Wardlaw v. United States, 203 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.

1953).
30. 319 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 986 (1964). See note 7 supra.
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ized the jury to infer rather than to presume that the defendant intended the
natural consequences of his own acts, the charge then introduced the phrase
"[s]o unless the contrary appears from the evidence," which indicated that the
defendant had to present evidence to prove lack of intent.31 The court found
that an inference that must be overcome by opposing evidence becomes, in
effect, a presumption that impermissably shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to rebut that presumption.3 2- The Mann majority, reversing another
tax evasion conviction, 33 focused on the requirement of showing "specific" intent3 4 to defeat or evade the tax as opposed to merely showing "general" in-

tent.3 5 The court noted that the Mann charge was especially dangerous when
given in a case that turned on establishing specific intent.36 The Mann charge
also included the instruction that the jury might infer that "the accused intended all the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and
possessing like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from any
act knowingly done or knowingly omitted by the accused." 3 7 In the view of the
majority, this language further compounded the error. 38 The court concluded
that the objectionable portion of the charge was not cured by what was said
elsewhere in the instructions39 because jury instructions must be consistent
31. 319 F.2d at 409.
32. Id. The majority agreed with the defendant's contention that authorizing the jury to
infer intent if they believed that the government's hypothesis was established by the evidence
was tantamount to an incriminating presumption that the jury could substitute for proof
absent opposing evidence. Id. at '408.
33. Dr. Nathan Mann, a Texas physician, was indicted for failing to report taxable income. Dr. Mann admitted the existence of the unreported income but contended that the
omissions resulted from the negligence and inefficiency of his accountant. Id. at 405-06.
34. 26 U.S.C. §7201 (1970) requires specific intent to defeat or evade the tax; such intent
must be proven by independent evidence.
35. General intent is "[a]n intention, purpose, or design, either without specific plan or
particular object, or without reference to such plan or object." BLAcK's LAw DIcrIONARY 947
(4th rev. ed. 1968).
36. The majority stated that "[s]uch a burden is especially harmful when a person is required to overcome a presumption as to anything subjective, such as intent or willfulness,
and a barrier almost impossible to hurdle results." Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d at 409. It
is interesting to note, however, that in Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965), which involved a conviction for willful failure to register
for and pay gambling tax, the Fifth Circuit endorsed the Mann language. The majority there
stated that the charges used in Edwards would have been more accurate if, instead of the
phrase "unless and until outweighed by evidence to the contrary," the court had used some
expression such as "unless the defendants produce some evidence to the contrary." Id. at 368.
In Edwards, the defendants produced no evidence that they did not know the gambling tax
law. Accordingly, the majority held that there was a rebuttable presumption that the defendants knew the law and therefore had the burden of producing some evidence in rebuttal. Id. at 367.
37. 319 F.2d at 407. This instruction appeared in an earlier edition of federal jury instructions. See Criminal General Instruction 4.06, 27 F.R.D. 39, 78 (1961).
38. See Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d at 409. But see Sherwin v. United States, 320
F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1963). cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964), in which this same instruction was
approved. Petitions for certiorari in both Mann and Sherwin were pending simultaneously but
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases.
39. 319 F.2d at 410.
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rather than misleading, and that it is never permissible to leave the jury with
the idea that a duty arises in the defendant to establish his innocence. 0 Although the defendant's attorney failed to object prior to the giving of the
charge, the court held that the charge nevertheless constituted plain error because it affected the defendant's fundamental rights. 4
Mann has been frequently cited by the Fifth Circuit, almost always in connection with an admonition to the district courts against continued use of the
forbidden charges.42 In approximately half of these cases, 43 however, the court
has distinguished Mann on the basis of two distinct theories. First, the error has
been held unprejudicial due to other curative language in the jury instructions. 4 Secondly, Mann has been distinguished when the court has determined,
after considering all of the facts and evidence presented in the case, that the
defendant's objective conduct, rather than his mental state, was the crucial
issue. 45 One recent illustration of the use of both theories is United States v.
40. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 297 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1961)).
41. Id. FED. R. C.1t. P. 52(b) provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
42. See United States v. Wilkinson, 460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972): "The fact that at this
late date in the development of the law on proof of specific intent so lengthy a discussion of
the problem is necessary here, highlights the need for more precise direction. We deem it
unwise to let this case go on the books as another exception to the rationale of Mann, or
worse, be understood that the instruction language used here should be repeated. The instruction given Wilkinson's jury, though not reversible under the circumstances here present,
sails perilously close to the shoal of an erroneous shifting of the burden of proof." Id. at 733.
"We hold today that the use of the Estes 'rebuttable presumption' language and Mann's 'So
unless the contrary appears' language, should be discontinued; and where the nature of the
case and the remaining portions of the charge do not alleviate the problem created, convictions based upon verdicts returned by juries so instructed will not be allowed to stand." Id.
at 734 (footnote omitted). Other circuits have also criticized charges which allegedly shift the
burden of proof; examples are cited in McCarty v. United States, 409 F.2d 793, 800 n.10 (10th
Cir. 1969).
43. The Chiantese majority states that "Mann is one of the most discussed if not the most
distinguished, cases in our circuit . . . [T]he Mann-outlawed charge appears here regularly.
More remarkably, the language Mann found to be plain error has been at the heart of approximately an equal number of affirmances and reversals." 560 F.2d at 1250.
44. In Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964
(1965), the court first used this theory to distinguish Mann in affirming a mail fraud and
securities violation conviction. The jury charge given was a variation of one of the three
charges designated by the Chiantese court as examples of the type of charge forbidden hereafter. See note 55 infra. The objectionable part of the Estes charge stated: "The law provides a rebuttable presumption that every man intends the natural and probabe consequences of his own acts. Wrongful acts knowingly or intentionally committed can neither
be justified nor excused on the ground of innocent intent. The color of the act determines
the complexion of the intent. The intent to injure or defraud can be presumed when the
unlawful act which results in loss or injury is proved to have been knowingly committed. It
is a well-settled rule that the intent can be presumed and inferred from the result of the
action." 335 F.2d at 615 n.11. The charge was not found to constitute prejudicial error when
the instructions were considered as a whole. Id. at 617.
The cure theory was also used to distinguish Mann in United States v. De Simone, 452
F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 959 (1972); United States v. Jenkins, 442
F.2d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1971).
45. See, e.g., Helms v. United States, 340 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
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Roberts,46 in which the majority affirmed an extortion conviction and held that
the improper Mann charge was cured by other portions of the instructions that
correctly placed the burden of proof upon the government. 47 The court went
on to say that such a charge would not have been substantially prejudicial anyway, due to the nature of the case and the evidence presented. 48 On the other
hand, Mann has also been followed frequently, 49 as evidenced by the holding
in United States v. Schilleci,5° reversing the wiretapping and perjury conviction
of a city police chief because a Mann-type charge was given. 51
In the instant case, after an extensive discussion 52 of prior inconsistently
reasoned decisions,5 3 the Fifth Circuit en banc attempted to abolish the recurring Mann-type charges by the use of directory action. The court's first decisive
and straightforward directive ordered the district courts to abandon the use of
charges that could be interpreted as shifting the burden of proof to the accused. 5 4 Three such charges were specified in the opinion 5 and two properly
814 (1965) (the exact instruction given in Mann was held not to constitute reversible error in
the appeal of a tax evasion conviction where defendant's objective conduct in preparing two
sets of records and using false tickets in making out his tax returns, rather than his mental
state, was found to be the crucial issue). See also cases cited at note 48 infra.
46. 546 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nom., Mancini v. United States, 431
U.S. 968 (1977).
47. Id. at 598-99. The Mann charge was given verbatim in Roberts. Id.
48. The evidence presented included undisputed threatening phone calls. Id. at 598. See
also United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976)
(conviction for possession of marijuana affirmed based upon the inclusion of curative statements in the instructions and evidence presented in the case); United States v. Wilkinson, 460
F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972) (mail fraud conviction involving the Estes charge affirmed; opinion
cited other correct jury instructions and affirmative objective evidence presented).
49. A number of convictions have been reversed based upon the use of Mann-type charges.
See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 513 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1975) (conviction for extortion reversed citing Mann charge and two evidentiary rulings, but later affirmed on retrial at 545
F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1977) with no discussion of Mann charge); United States v. Driscoll, 454
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1972) (securities transaction conviction reversed due to Mann charge);
Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1970) (mail fraud conviction reversed due
to Mann charge); South v. United States, 412 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1969) (gambling conviction
reversed due to Mann charge).
50. 545 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. In Schilleci, a charge almost identical to the Mann charge was given, followed by the
instruction inviting the jurors to speculate as to what any other person similarly situated
would reasonably have expected to be the consequences of such actions. Id. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
52. In the text of the opinion, the majority discussed twenty-five cases involving the use
of Mann-type charges. 560 F.2d at 1246-54.
53. Judge Clark, in his opening remarks, stated that the en banc review was warranted by
the inconsistency of the court's prior discussions on the proof of intent instruction and by the
"much too frequent" recurrence of the erroneous charges. United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d
at 1245.
54. The directive reads: "No district court in this circuit shall include in its charge to the
july an instruction on proof of intent which is couched in language which could reasonably
be interpreted as shifting the burden to the accused to produce proof of innocence." Id. at
1255.
55. The following examples of unacceptable charges were given by the court: (1) "It is
reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of
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stated alternative charges were recommended.6 The court then proceeded to
direct that if the condemned charges are given in the future, the error will not
be absolved by other curative language in the instructions correctly placing the
burden of proof.57 However, the members of the majority refused to extend
their mandates to establish any per se rule; the third directive continues to allow afirmance of some cases in which the condemned charges are given despite
the Fifth Circuit's directions. Whether or not such convictions will be reversed
is to be determined by weighing the harm to the accused in the context of each
specific case. 8
The primary point of disagreement among the members of the court revolved around the implications of the majority's directives and their potential
effect upon the future use of Mann-type charges. Chief Judge Brown, author of
the earlier panel opinion, concurred with the majority, conceding that the
stringency of automatic reversal was no longer necessary due to the explicit
mandates in the en banc opinion.59 He did, however, confess to sharing the
concerns of Judge Godbold, although he was not thereby compelled to dissent.
In a brief but decisive opinion, 0 Judge Godbold expressed his belief that the
Mann charge should produce automatic reversal. He reasoned that this would
acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. So unless the contrary appears from the evidence,
the jury may draw the inference that the accused intended all the consequences which one
standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from any act knowingly done or knowingly omitted by the accused." (2)
"The presumption is that a person intends the natural consequences of his acts and the
natural presumption would be if a person consciously, knowingly, or intentionally acted, he
intends to violate the law." (3) "The law presumes that every man intends the natural and
probable consequences of his own knowing acts. Wrongful acts knowingly or intentionally
committed can neither be justified or excused on the ground of innocent intent. The intent

to injure or defraud can be presumed when the unlawful act which results in loss or injury
is proved to have been knowingly committed." Id.
56. The court first recommended the suggested instruction in United States v. Wilkinson,
460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972): "It is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the

natural and probable consequences of his knowing acts. The jury may draw the inference that
the accused intended all of the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and
possessing like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from any intentional act
or conscious omission. Any such inference drawn is entitled to be considered by the jury in
determining whether or not the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant possessed the required criminal intent." Id. at 730. As an alternative, the court
suggested the form contained in 1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 7. United States v.
Chiantese, 560 F.2d at 1255-56.
57. The second directive states: "The error in giving such a burden-shifting charge will
not be absolved because other phrases defining the proper burden of proof are included in
the instructions, no matter how often such corrective phrases are repeated." 560 F.2d at 1255.
58. The third directive states: "We refuse to classify the giving of a charge in violation
of paragraph 1 [See note 54 supra], whether objected to or not, as the type of error which
will automatically produce reversal. If, despite our action today, the error should recur, the
weighing of its harm to the accused shall remain a judicial matter to be resolved in the context of each case where it occurs. Such weighing, however, shall not include consideration of
whether a defective charge has been cured by prior or subsequent statements. 560 F.2d at 1255.
59. Id. at 1256. The en banc opinion was written by Judge Clark who did not participate
in the panel decision.
60. Judge Godbold concurred in part and dissented in part. He was joined by Judges
Tuttle and Goldberg. Id. at 1259.
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create the clarity and certainty not provided by the majority's holding, which
he characterized as inviting the district courts "to continue to roll the dice on
possible reversal."61
Judge Hill's specially concurring opinion -' consisted of two distinct parts.
First, he expressed approval of the court's straightforward action to dispel the
prevailing confusion surrounding the use of the Mann charge. 3 However, he
felt compelled to write a separate opinion to explain his disagreement with the
majority's underlying premise concerning the Mann charge. Distinguishing an
inference from a presumption, 64 Judge Hill concluded that the Mann charge
did not shift the burden of proof, but merely authorized the jury to draw
inferences from proven facts.65 He theorized that the charge was a vestige of the
classic instruction on circumstantial evidence that directed the jurors not to
find the defendant guilty "unless the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt." 66 Consequently, Judge Hill viewed the Mann charge
67
as a cautionary instruction for the defendant's benefit and protection.
The instant court gave no reason for rejecting automatic reversal as a solution to the persistent use of impermissible Mann-type charges. The most logical
assumption is that the majority felt the severity of automatic reversal was unnecessary and likely to produce injustice in certain situations.68 Apparently,
the decision to forego this method of enforcing their previous condemnation of
the Mann charge was based upon recognition of the court's own prior incon-

61.

Id.

62. Judge Hill was joined by Judge Gee.
63. Judge Hill apparently felt that the court had accomplished its purpose of ending the
confusion: "[I]t is time to still the waters, troubled since Mann. Judge Clark's opinion for
the court accomplishes that good purpose .... " 560 F.2d at 1259.
64. Judge Hill defined a presumption as a deduction that the trier of fact is required by
law to make. He concluded, accordingly, that a rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of
proof to the defendant and an irrebuttable presumption does not allow the defendant an
opportunity to overcome the presumption. He defined an inference as a deduction that the
trier of fact may but is not required to make. Id. at 1257.
65. Id. Judge Hill stated that an inference is a method by which the trier of fact may
determine whether or not the party with the burden of proof has carried it (citing Edwards
v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 366-68 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965));
Knapp v. United States, 316 F.2d 794, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1963); Barfield v. United States, 229
F.2d 936, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1956)).
66. 560 F.2d at 1258 (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), which held that
this instruction was merely confusing and incorrect when the jury was properly instructed
that the defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).
67. 560 F.2d at 1258. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Ainsworth, joined by Judge Roney,
agreed with Judge Hill's view of the Mann charge as intended for the benefit of the defendant. He concurred with the majority's decision that the charge should not produce
automatic reversal. However, he criticized the majority's opinion, characterizing it as leaving
the state of the law essentially unchanged. Id. at 1260.
68. The opinion stated that the recommended alternative charges are not for use in any
specific form in all cases, but that whether to give a specific charge or any charge at all must
be determined on a case to case basis. Id. at 1256. This seems indicative of the court's general
feeling that injustice must be avoided by considering each individual case.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 6
1978]

CASE COMMENTS

sistencies.69 It may be inferred that the majority believed the Chiantese directives would resolve the problem without the necessity of more drastic action. 0
Although the majority's reasoning in itself appears sound, 71 the provision
of guidelines for future use in evaluating the harm done by Mann-type charges
seems to suggest an inherent contradiction in the court's directives. While
resort to automatic reversal was purportedly not needed to resolve the problem,
it seems obvious that the court was unconvinced that the directive forbidding
further use of the condemned charges would be adhered to by the lower
courts. 72 This ambivalence on the part of the Fifth Circuit may be interpreted
as inviting or at least allowing district court judges to disregard the directive,
particularly when the outcome of the case at bar does not turn on specific intent. It seems, therefore, that the real problem suggested by the instant opinion

is not merely whether Mann-type jury charges constitute reversible error, but
rather by what means the Fifth Circuit can persuade recalcitrant courts to
3
follow its mandates.
Although the instant opinion dearly delineates the court's disapproval of
the use of such charges, this policy is certainly not new and has been expounded in a myriad of previous Fifth Circuit opinions.74 It seems questionable
69. "Many district courts in this circuit have not bothered to restructure their charge on
proof of intent. Perhaps this is because our precedents over 14 years furnish no consistent or
predictable rule that would encourage the change." Id. at 1255.
70. "A majority of the court en banc has determined that directory action of a supervisory nature must supplant the more normal adjudicatory process if we are to eliminate
this chronic issue." Id.
71. In his dissent, Judge Ainsworth suggested that the majority's decision against automatic reversal was "mandated by common sense, and by the Supreme Court's ruling...." Id.
at 1260.
72. This is indicated by the second and third directives delineating the factors which will
be considered if the charge is used again. Id. at 1255.
73. If the court succeeds in abolishing the use of Mann-type charges, the question of
whether such charges constitute reversible error will be a moot issue. However, disregard of
Fifth Circuit mandates is a recurring problem. Another example of this problem involves the
Blue charge. See United States v. Blue, 430 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970) (the court criticized a
charge which indicated to the jury that it should convict unless it believed the government
witnesses were lying). See also United States v. Williams, 473 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing where a Blue-type charge was used); United States v. Womack, 454 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir.
1972) (expressly disapproving the Blue charge and reversing); United States v. Garza, 426
F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1970) (conviction reversed due to Blue-type charge). Another recurring
condemned charge is the "slight evidence" instruction. See United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d
621 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussed in note 86 infra). Still another example of the problem is the
Allen, or "dynamite" charge in which the jurors are instructed that minority jurors should
consider whether their doubts are reasonable in the interest of reaching a verdict. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bailey, 468 F-.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd en banc, 480 F.2d 518 (1973). See
also Note, Due Process, JudicialEconomy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen
Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967); Comment, Instructing Deadlocked Juries: The Present
Status of the Allen Charge, 3 TEx. TECH. L. Rav. 313 (1972). Although much of the modem
criticism of the Allen charge is derived from early Fifth Circuit minority opinions, that
circuit still continues to decide on a case by case basis whether such a charge produces a
coercive effect and thus constitutes reversible error. Id. at 339. The Third, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits have totally abolished the Allen charge. United States v. Bailey, 460 F.2d at 667.
74. See note 40 supraand accompanying text.
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whether this opinion will have a more profound effect than the other opinions
that have gone unheeded. This raises the underlying question of why district
courts have continued to use the condemned charges despite the appellate
court's explicit instructions against their use. Probably the most likely reason is
the continued existence of outdated jury forms. Although the objectionable
language has been deleted from the 1977 edition of Federal Jury Practice and
Instructions,75 apparently the lower courts have not updated their instructions
accordingly:6 Perhaps they have not felt that it was necessary to do so when
the Fifth Circuit has continued to hand down inconsistent opinions.7 7 Hesitancy in effectuating the change may also be attributable to basic disagreement
with the court's interpretation of the meaning of Mann-type charges. As suggested by the dissenting opinion in the instant case, district judges may not
agree that the Mann language shifts the burden of proof to the defendant78
Accordingly, judges who approve of the inclusion of such language may wish
to continue its use as a matter of principle. A further reason for the continued
use of these charges may be the fact that the condemned language constitutes
but a small portion of the entire jury charge and therefore may seem insignificant in relation to other language that correctly instructs on the burden of
proof.
The inherent necessity of weighing the evidence and the facts of each case
to determine whether a particular error warrants reversal presents a due process
consideration.79 In future appeals, the court will be put in the position of
balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial and to proper jury instructions
against the rule that error that does not affect the defendant's substantial rights
shall be disregarded.80 By failing to affirm the panel opinion and adopt a position requiring automatic reversal, the court continues to impose upon itself
the heavy burden of determining whether or not each defendant has been afforded due process of law.
In his separate opinion, Judge Godbold reduces the majority's holding to a
basic incongruity: "[I]f you say it we will decide whether to reverse but in doing so we won't consider anything else you said." ' He suggests that this ruling
75. See note 7 supra.
76. "Unlike the form book editors .. .many district courts in this circuit have not
bothered to restructure their charge on proof of intent." United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d
at 1255.
77. See note 43 supra.
78. See 560 F.2d at 1259-62 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
79. See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969).
80. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) states: "Harmless error. Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." See generally Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (discussion of "harmless-constitutional-error-rule" in reversal
of conviction where both prosecutor & jury instructions commented on defendant's failure to
testify); Comment, Criminal Lau, -Harmless Error: A Criminal Trial Error Is Harmless If
Competent Evidence Furnishes Overwhelming Proof of Defendant's Guilt and There Exists
No Significant Probability That Defendant Would Have Been Acquitted Had the Error Not
Occurred, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rrv. 373 (1975).
81. 560 F.2d at 1259.
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conflicts with the general law of jury instructions: namely, that they are to be
read and considered as a whole rather than sentence by sentence8 2 The major83
ity opinion in the instant case omitted any mention of this frequently cited
4
rule of law. By contrast, in United States v. Wilkinson the Fifth Circuit relied upon this well-established principle in its decision, concluding that the
jury charge was accurate when considered in its entirety.85
The Fifth Circuit seems to have made a tenuous distinction between curative language in the jury instructions and harmless error.8 6 The court is decidedly willing to consider the facts and evidence of each case in determining
whether the effect of an improper charge constitutes harmless error,87 yet it is
not willing to consider jury instructions as a whole in making this determination, although logically the instructions also appear to affect the defendant's
rights. One might infer from the court's refusal to consider curative language
in deciding whether to reverse that Mann-type charges present such great potential for injustice that no amount of corrective language could cure the
damage which might result. However, the majority apparently did not consider the potential harm sufficient to mandate automatic reversal.
Despite the court's explicit directives and expressly stated design to prevent
further use of burden-shifting jury charges, the ultimate effect of the instant
case holding seems uncertain. In addition to the possibility that the district
court judges may continue to use the condemned charges, the outlined criteria
for determining whether the error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal
allows a vast amount of judicial latitude.8 The court will surely look more
82. Many of the cases decided by the Fifth Circuit and by other circuits have cited this
rule of law in considering whether to reverse convictions due to erroneous jury charges. See,
e.g., United States v. Leal, 547 F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir. 1977) (in affirming a conviction for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the court reviewed the trial judge's instructions as a whole); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Haldeman
claimed several errors in the court's specific intent instructions; the court considered the instructions as a whole and found no plain error); United States v. Cisneros, 491 F.2d 1068,
1072-73 (5th Cir. 1974) (the district court judge's comments to the jury communicated his
belief that the courtroom behavior of one of the witnesses was suspicious; the appellate court
considered the instructions as a whole and found reversible error).
83. See note 82 supra.
84. 460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972).
85. The Wilkinson court stated: "It is well-established that the fairness and accuracy of a
jury charge is to be read and tested as a whole, and not by a single isolated sentence or remark." Id. at 732 (citations omitted). This statement has been cited frequently by courts
finding cures in jury instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Netterville, 553 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Roberts, 546 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cisneros, 491
F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1974).
86. This distinction is indicated in United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1977),
in which the government relied on the line of post-Mann decisions in urging the court to
search for harmless error or for cure with respect to the giving of the "slight evidence" instruction. The court refused to do so but noted that a conflict had arisen in the Fifth Circuit
as to whether the court should continue to search for harmless error or cure. The court
noted that a rehearing en banc had been granted in Chiantese to resolve the question. Id. at
629 n.8.
87. See note 80 supra.
88. For example, the court must carefully weigh all of the evidence presented at the trial
court level (which it did not hear or see presented) to decide whether or not facts were proven
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